پاورقی های ديدگاه‌های فلسفی عربِ معاصر درباره‌ی سکولاريسم

1 For a comparative study of secularism, see Nur Yalman, “On Secularism and its Critics: Notes on Turkey, India, and Iran.” Contributions to Indian Sociology, volume 25, 1991.
2 Ernest Gellner, Postmodernism, Reason and Religion (London: Routledge, 1992), 5.
3 A recent Festschrift has been devoted to Fu’ad Zakariyya by his students from Kuwait University. See ‘Abdallah al-‘Umar, ed., al-Duktur Fu’ad Zakariyya Bahithan wa muthaqaffan wa naqidan: kitab tidhkari (Kuwait: University of Kuwait Press, 1998).
4 See Galal Amin, “Hawla mafhum al-tanwir: nadhrah naqdiyyah li tayyar assassi min tayyarat al-thaqafah al-‘arabiyyah al-mu‘usirah.” Al-Mustaqbal al-‘Arabi, volume 20(7), 1997, 35–51. In an insightful article on the “secularism debate in contemporary Egypt,” Fauzi Najjar mentions that the tanwiri movement in Egypt is supported in the main by the Egyptian Ministry of Culture and that their books are printed by the General Egyptian Book Organization, which is a government organ. See the following by Fauzi M. Najjar, “The Debate on Islam and Secularism in Egypt.” Arab Studies Quarterly, volume 18(2), Spring 1996, 1–22, and “Book Banning in Contemporary Egypt.” The Muslim World, volume 91(3 and 4), Fall 2001, 399–424.
5 See al-Bukhari Hamani, “Makanat Zaki Najib Mahmud fi’l falsafah al-‘arabiyyah al-mu‘asirah.” Al-Mustaqbal al-‘Arabi, volume 20(8), 1997, 48–55, and Salah Qunsuwwa, “al-‘Aql al-‘Arabi wa’l thaqafah al-‘arabiyyah: hiwar ma‘ Zaki Najib Mahmud.” Al-Mustaqbal al-‘Arabi, volume 11(8), 1988, 121–33.
6 Galal Amin, al-Tanwir al-za’if (Cairo: Dar al-Ma‘arif, 1999), 28.
7 This thesis is highlighted mainly by Burhan Ghalyun in Ightiyal al-‘aql: mihnat al-thaqafah al-‘arabiyya bayna al-salafi yya wa’l taba‘iyyah (Cairo: Madbuli, 1990).
8 Zakariyya, al-Sahwah al-islamiyyah fi mizan al-‘aql (Beirut: Dar al-Tanwir, 1995), 73. Hassan Hanafi of Cairo University more or less argues the same point: “In essence, Islam is a secular religion. What this means in effect is that there is no room in Islam for an additional kind of secularism, especially the Western one.” Hassan Hanafi, al-Din wa’l thawrah fi misr, volume 8 (Cairo: Madbuli, 1989), 105.
9 “Nous autres musulmans avons grand besoin de quelqu’un qui nous dise, comme les philosophes de la Renaissance: ‘Si vous avez devant vous la nature et les problèmes des hommes, pourquoi faut-il que toujours vous reveniez aux textes des ancèstres?’ Pourquoi faites-vous de la pensée heritée une autorité inniscutable? Pourquoi ne pas affronter les situations nouvelles avec vôtre raison? Selon moi, cette incapacité du monde arabe à historiciser sa relation au passé constitue la cause première de son sous-développement intellectuel.” (“We Muslims have a great need of someone who would tell us, as the philosophers of the Renaissance did, ‘If you have in front of you the nature and problems of humanity, why must you always return to the ancestors’ texts?’ Why do you make traditional thought an infallible authority? Why not confront new situations with your own reasoning? To my mind, this inability of the Arab world to historicize its relationship to the past constitutes the main cause of its intellectual underdevelopment.” Translation by Abu-Rabi‘) Fu’ad Zakariyya, Laïcité ou Islamisme. Les Arabes à l’heure du choix (Paris: La Découverte, 1989), 38. Quoted by Massimo Campanini, “Egypt,” in Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman, eds., History of Islamic Philosophy, volume 2 (London: Routledge, 1996), 1120.
10 Fu’ad Zakariyya, al-Haqiqa wa’l khayal fi ’l harakah al-islamiyyah al-mu‘asirah [Reality and Myth in the Contemporary Islamic Movement] (Cairo: Dar Sina, 1988). Zakariyya has this to say about secularism: “The European secular movement was not a reaction against religion but against a method of thinking. Europeans were advancing in science and industrialization. They aimed to expand and dominate the entire world. The biggest obstacle to these advances was the closed religious thinking of the church. The secularists opposed intellectual rigidity while remaining committed to their own faith.” Quoted by Nancy E. Gallagher, “Islam v. Secularism in Cairo: An Account of the Dar al-Hikma Debate.” Middle Eastern Studies, volume, 25(2), April 1989, 210.
11 Zakariyya, al-Haqiqah wa’l khayal,7.
12 Fu’ad Zakariyya, Khitab ila al-‘aql al-‘arabi (Cairo: Maktabat Misr, 1990), 21.
13 See Mohammed Arkoun, Essais sur la pensée islamique (Paris: Editions Maisonneuve et Larose, 1977) and Pour une critique de la raison islamique (Paris: Editions Maisonneuve et Larose, 1984). See also Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, Mafhum al-nass: dirasah fi ‘ulum al-Qur‘an (Cairo: al-Hay’ah al-Misriyyah, 1990).
14 Zakariyya, al-Haqiqah wa’l khayal, 10.
15 Ibid., 11.
16 Ibid.,15. In another place Zakariyya comments on extremism: “The true reason surrounding these extreme phenomena is, in my view, the political use made of Islam. The young extremists are part of a huge bureaucracy which continues to grow and swell since the early seventies. Its aim is to exploit Islam in order to achieve political goals. Like any small part of a huge bureaucracy, it knows its aim well and marches to execute its mission relentlessly. Since these youngsters were taught that the commandments of religion bid them to lead society and since they heard from their counselors that society will not be set right unless it places itself under their tutelage, they, therefore, allow themselves to take the law into their own hands according to their law and methods...Just imagine how society could attain perfection if every individual within it has the right to be a lawgiver, judge and a policeman at one and the same time.” Fu’ad Zakariyya, Al-Ahram, March 1988, translated and quoted by David Sagiv, “Judge Ashmawi and Militant Islam in Egypt.” Middle Eastern Studies, volume 28(3), July 1992, 541.
17 Zakariyya, al-Haqiqah wa’l khayal, 17.
18 Ibid., 19.
19 Ibid., 22.
20 Ibid., 22.
21 Samir Amin proposes the same argument. See Samir Amin, The Arab Nation: Nationalism and Class Struggle (London: Zed Books, 1987).
22 Zakariyya, al-Haqiqah wa’l khayal, 23. See also Fu’ad Zakariyya, “People Direct Islam in any Direction they Wish.” Middle East Times, May 28–June 3, 1991, 15.
23 Ibid., 24.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., 25.
26 Ibid., 25–6.
27 For more details, see Fu’ad Zakariyya, al-‘Arab wa’l namudhaj al-ameriki (Cairo: Maktabat Misr, 1990).
28 “The religious criticism described in his chapter is undeniably a vigorous expression of political opposition to the Saudi ruling elite. That criticism is not merely a one-sided assault, it invites argumentative exchange.” Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 232. On protest movements in Saudi Arabia, see Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent (London: Palgrave, 1999). On the larger context of the alliance between Wahabiyyah and the state in Saudi Arabia, see Alexei Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia (New York: New York University Press, 2000).
29 Nihilism is summarized by the death of God thesis uttered by Nietzsche; in that sense, nihilism means the devaluation of the highest value; the highest value being God. For more details, see

G. Vattimo, The End of Modernity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Postmodern Culture (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), especially chapter 1.
30 “Ultimate Concern is the abstract translation of the great commandment: ‘The Lord, our God, the Lord is one; and you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul and with all your mind, and with all your strength’.” Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, volume 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 12.
31 Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).
32 L. Binder, Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 80–1.
33 Leo Strauss, What is Political Philosophy? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 13.
34 Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, 2 volumes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962).
35 See Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966).
36 Amin, al-Tanwir al-za’if, 45.
37 Ibid., 56–7.
38 Ghalyun, Ightiyal al-‘aql, 247.
39 In speaking of the differences between fundamentalism and modernity, Albert Memmi, a French thinker of Tunisian Jewish background, has this to say: “L’integrisme correspond à une conception complète de l’existence, émotionnelle et systématique...Cette conception, que l’on pourrait appeler totalitaire, n’est pas seulement le fait d’esprits religieux: il existe des totalitarismes en politique comme en philosophie. Ils reposent sur deux postulats. Le premier est que la vérité, évidemment leur propre conception de la vérité, est absolue. Intégrisme signifie intégrité de la tradition, évidemment interprétée à leur manière. Elle ne supporte donc aucune autre restriction, sans être elle-même en danger. Ce qui prouve, à mon sens, que, malgré les apparences, les totalitaristes ne sont ni tellement sûrs d’eux-mêmes ni sûrs de leur vérité, sinon ils n’auraient pas besoin de la défendre si âprement. Ils ont besoin de mettre Dieu dans leur jeu. Le second postulat, qui découle du premier, est que les individus et les peuples qui s’opposent à cette conception unitaire doivent être mis dans l’impossibilité de nuire, par la coercition, par la destruction s’il le faut. L’idéologie se clôt par une action radicale, sans quoi elle ne serait pas totale.” (“Fundamentalism corresponds to a complete conception of existence, emotional and systematic. This conception, which one can call totalitarian, is not only the product of religious minds. Types of totalitarianism exist in politics as in philosophy. They depend on two postulates. The first is that truth, obviously their conception of truth, is absolute. Fundamentalism signifies integrity of tradition, of course, interpreted their way. Fundamentalism cannot support any other restriction without being compromised. That proves, to my mind, that in spite of appearances, totalitarians are neither so sure of themselves nor so sure of their truth; otherwise they would not need to defend it so bitterly. They need to bring God into their camp. The second postulate, which derives from the former, is that individuals and peoples who oppose this monolithic conception must be neutralized by coercion and destruction, if necessary. Ideology is cemented by a radical action; otherwise, it would not be total.” Translation by Abu-Rabi‘.) Albert Memmi, “Integrisme et laïcité.” Le Monde Diplomatique, March 1989, 3.
40 Burhan Ghalyun, Naqd al-siyassa: al-dawla wa’l din (Beirut: Dar al-Tali‘ah, 1991), 192.
41 Eickelman notes that, “The prevailing secularist bias of many current theories of society has alternately marginalized and demonized religious forces and religious intellectuals.” Dale Eickelman, “Islam and the Languages of Modernity.” Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Winter 2000, 132.
39 Ghalyun, Naqd al-siyassa, 239–40. See also Burhan Ghalyun, “al-Islam wa azmat ‘alaqat alsultah al-ijtima‘iyyah,” in Markaz Dirasat al-Wihdah al-‘Arabiyyah, al-Din fi ’l mujtam‘ al-‘arabi (Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Wihdah al-‘Arabiyyah, 1990), 303.
42 Ibid., 262.
43 Ghalyun, Naqd al-siyassah, 262.
44 Amartya Sen, “The Threats to Secular India.” New York Review of Books, volume 40(7), April 8, 1993, 28.
45 Bernard Lewis, The Jews of Islam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 3.
46 For an interesting view, see Nurcholis Madjid, “Islamic Roots of Modern Pluralism: Indonesian Experiences.” Studia Islamika: Indonesian Journal for Islamic Studies, volume 1(1), 1994, 55–77.
47 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989).
48 Jamal al-Ghitani, one of the best known novelists in contemporary Egypt, makes the point that, “In the battle between a religious extremism and terrorism seeking to bring down a corrupt and basically repressive government, the choice for many of us, lamentable though it may be, is to side with the army and regime.” Quoted by Edward Said, “The Other Arab Muslims,” in his The Politics of Dispossession (New York: Vintage, 1994), 400.